FindLaw : Legal Subjects : Ethics and Professional Responsibility : Supreme Court Decisions

• Robertson v. Chapman ,152 U.S. 673 (1894) (Probate attorney not liable to client for fraud in property sale).
• Ex parte Lockwood , 154 U.S. 116 (1894) (It was for the supreme court of appeals to construe the statute of Virginia in question, and to determine whether the word 'person' as therein used is confined to males, and whether women are admitted to practice law in that commonwealth).
• Selling v. Radford , 243 U.S. 46 (1917) (Beyond all question, when admission to the Bar of this court is secured, that right may not be taken away except by the action of this court. While this is true, it is also true that the character and scope of the investigation to be made on a prayer for disbarment, before sanction is given to it, must depend upon the character of the acts of misconduct and wrong relied upon, of the place of their commission, and the nature of the proof relied upon to establish their existence).
• Yeiser v. Dysart , 267 U.S. 540 (1925) (When we add the considerations that an attorney practices under a license from the State and that the subject- matter is a right created by statute it is obvious that the State may attach such conditions to the license in respect of such matters as it believes to be necessary in order to make it a public good).
• In re Summers , 325 U.S. 561 (1945) (It is impossible for us to conclude that the insistence of Illinois that an officer who is charged with the administration of justice must take an oath to support the Constitution of Illinois and Illinois' interpretation of that oath to require a willingness to perform military service violates the principles of religious freedom which the Fourteenth Amendment secures against state action, when a like interpretation of a similar oath as to the Federal Constitution bars an alien from national citizenship).
• Hickman v. Taylor , 329 U.S. 495 (1947) (Historically, a lawyer is an officer of the court and is bound to work for the advancement of justice while faithfully protecting the rightful interests of his clients. In performing his various duties, however, it is essential that a lawyer work with a certain degree of privacy, free from unnecessary intrusion by opposing parties and their counsel).
• In re Isserman , 345 U.S. 286 (1953) (Disbarment by a state does not automatically disbar members of our bar, but this Court will, in the absence of some grave reason to the contrary, follow the finding of the state that the character requisite for membership in the bar is lacking).
• Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners of State of New Mexico , 353 U.S. 232 (1957) (A State can require high standards of qualifications, such as good moral character or proficiency in its law, before it admits an applicant to the bar; but any qualification must have a rational connection with the applicant's fitness or capacity to practice law).
• Konigsberg v. State Bar of California , 353 U.S. 252 (1957) (That petitioner was a member of the Communist Party in 1941, if true, does not support an inference that he did not have good moral character, absent any evidence that he ever engaged in or abetted or supported any unlawful or immoral activities).
• Theard v. U.S. , 354 U.S. 278 (1957) (We do not think that "the principles of right and justice" require a federal court to enforce disbarment of a man eighteen years after he had uttered a forgery when concededly he "was suffering under an exceedingly abnormal mental condition, some degree of insanity").
• Konigsberg v. State Bar of California , 366 U.S. 36 (1961) (The Fourteenth Amendment's protection against arbitrary state action does not forbid a State from denying admission to a bar applicant so long as he refuses to answer questions having a substantial relevance to his qualifications; and California's application of such a rule in this instance cannot be said to have been arbitrary or discriminatory).
• Cohen v. Hurley , 366 U.S. 117 (1961) (Solely on the ground of his refusal to cooperate in the court's efforts to expose unethical practices and without any independent proof of wrongdoing on his part, petitioner was disbarred by the state court. Such disciplinary action did not violate petitioner's rights under the Fourteenth Amendment).
• In re Anastaplo , 366 U.S. 82 (1961) (The fact that there was no independent evidence that petitioner had ever been a member of the Communist Party did not prevent the State, acting in good faith, from making this inquiry in an investigation of this kind).
• National Ass'n for Advancement of Colored People v. Button , 371 U.S. 415 (1963) (Under Virginia statute, a person who advises another that his legal rights have been infringed and refers him to a particular attorney or group of attorneys for assistance has committed a crime, as has the attorney who knowingly renders assistance under such circumstances; there thus inheres in the statute the gravest danger of smothering all discussion looking to the eventual institution of litigation on behalf of the rights of Negroes; and, as so construed, statute violated the Fourteenth Amendment by unduly inhibiting protected freedoms of expression and association).
• Willner v. Committee on Character and Fitness , 373 U.S. 96 (1963) (Where, as here, the Appellate Division held no hearings of its own to determine petitioner's character but relied entirely upon the report of the Committee, it cannot escape the requirements of due process by claiming that the Committee's action was merely advisory).
• Spevack v. Klein , 385 U.S. 511 (1967) (Where, as here, the Appellate Division held no hearings of its own to determine petitioner's character but relied entirely upon the report of the Committee, it cannot escape the requirements of due process by claiming that the Committee's action was merely advisory).
• In re Ruffalo , 390 U.S. 544 (1968) (The lack of notice to petitioner, prior to the time he and a witness testified, that petitioner's employment of witness would be considered a disbarment offense deprived petitioner of procedural due process).
• Law Students Civil Rights Research Council, Inc. v. Wadmond , 401 U.S. 154 (1971) (The "character and general fitness" requirement for admission to the New York Bar is not violative of the Constitution).
• Baird v. State Bar of Arizona , 401 U.S. 1 (1971) (Views and beliefs are immune from bar committee inquisitions designed to lay a foundation for barring an applicant from the practice of law, which is a matter of right for one qualified by learning and moral character).
• Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar , 421 U.S. 773 (1975) (Here the State Bar, by providing that deviation from the minimum fees may lead to disciplinary action, has voluntarily joined in what is essentially a private anticompetitive activity and hence cannot claim it is beyond the Sherman Act's reach).
• Bates v. State Bar of Arizona , 433 U.S. 350 (1977) (Advertising legal services is not inherently misleading. Only routine services lend themselves to advertising, and for such services fixed rates can be meaningfully established, as the Arizona State Bar's own Legal Services Program demonstrates. Commercial speech, which serves individual and societal interests in assuring informed and reliable decisionmaking, is entitled to some First Amendment protection and the justifications advanced by appellee are inadequate to support the suppression of all advertising by attorneys)
• Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n , 436 U.S. 447 (1978) (The Bar, acting with state authorization, constitutionally may discipline a lawyer for soliciting clients in person, for pecuniary gain, under circumstances likely to pose dangers that the State has a right to prevent, and thus the application of the Disciplinary Rules in question to appellant does not offend the Constitution).
• In re Primus , 436 U.S. 412 (1978) ( South Carolina's application of its Disciplinary Rules to appellant's solicitation by letter on the ACLU's behalf violates the First and Fourteenth Amendments).
• Leis v. Flynt , 439 U.S. 438 (1979) (The interest of out-of-state attorneys, who were not admitted to practice law in Ohio, in representing defendants in an Ohio criminal prosecution held not to be a cognizable property or liberty interest within the terms of the Fourteenth Amendment, absent any showing of an independent state- or federal-law source for the interest. Hence, the Constitution did not obligate the Ohio courts to accord such attorneys procedural due process on their application for permission to appear pro hac vice).
• In re R. M. J. , 455 U.S. 191 (1982) (State bar discipline against lawwyer who: 1) published advertisements which listed areas of practice in language other than that specified in the Rule; 2) listed the courts in which appellant was admitted to practice although this information was not included among the 10 categories of information authorized by the Rule; 3) mailed announcement cards to persons other than those permitted by the Rule was a violation of lawyer's First Amendment rights).
• Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel of Supreme Court of Ohio , 471 U.S. 626 (1985) (Insofar as lawyer reprimand was based on appellant's use of an illustration in his advertisement and his offer of legal advice, the reprimand violated his First Amendment rights).
• Keller v. State Bar of California , 496 U.S. 1 (1990) (State Bar's use of petitioners' compulsory dues to finance political and ideological activities with which petitioners disagree violates their First Amendment right of free speech when such expenditures are not necessarily or reasonably incurred for the purpose of regulating the legal profession or improving the quality of legal services).
• Florida Bar v. Went for It, Inc. , 515 U.S. 618 (1995) (Florida Bar rules prohibiting personal injury lawyers from sending targeted direct-mail solicitations to victims and their relatives for 30 days following an accident or disaster do not violate the First and Fourteenth Amendments).

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