The Minnesota Supreme Court recently delved into a provocative legal debate concerning the boundaries of indecent exposure laws. The case has raised significant constitutional questions about equal protection and the intent behind the exposure, with arguments touching on whether such laws are applied equally to men and women. Let’s look at what happened.
Plancarte’s Arrest and Conviction
The incident underlying the case involved one Eloisa Rubi Plancarte, who was arrested and charged with indecent exposure following an incident in a convenience store parking lot in Rochester, Minnesota.
The events unfolded on a July evening in 2021, when Rochester police received a call around 9:50 PM reporting that a woman was walking around the parking lot of a Kwik Trip convenience store with her breasts fully exposed. Upon arrival, officers immediately recognized Plancarte from a similar incident that had occurred earlier that week. The parking lot was brightly illuminated and there were several cars stationed at the pumps, making the scene highly visible to the public.
When questioned by the officers about her behavior, Plancarte responded nonchalantly, stating, "Catholic girls do it all the time" and adding, "I dance at the biker club; I'm a stripper." The officer, emphasizing the inappropriateness of her actions, replied, "Well, you can't strip in the middle of the public." Plancarte was subsequently arrested and taken to jail. State prosecutors charged her with indecent exposure under a statute that criminalizes “willfully and lewdly” exposing one’s body, “or the private parts thereof.”
Plancarte’s Defenses
Plancarte moved to dismiss the charges, arguing a couple of different legal theories.
She first presented a sufficiency-of-the-evidence argument, claiming that the prosecution had not submitted enough evidence to the court to show that she had violated the law. She argued that her conduct did not meet the statutory definition of "lewdly" exposing her body or private parts. She contended that her breasts should not be considered "private parts" under the statute and that her mere public display of them did not satisfy the statutory term "lewdly."
In the alternative, Plancarte asserted an Equal Protection argument. Basically, she claimed that even if the evidence was sufficient to show that she violated the statute in question, the statute's application was discriminatory because it penalized women for going topless while allowing men to do so without consequence. She claimed that prosecuting her for going topless, while not prosecuting men for similar behavior, violated the Equal Protection Clause of the U.S. Constitution.
Despite her arguments, the district court found her guilty of indecent exposure and stayed adjudication on a controlled-substance charge. The court placed her on probation and sentenced her to serve 90 days in jail.
Plancarte then appealed the decision to the Court of Appeals of Minnesota.
Appeals Ruling
Addressing the evidentiary sufficiency argument, the court examined the statutory language and legislative intent. It ultimately concluded that a woman's fully exposed breasts are considered "private parts" under the statute. The court also determined that Plancarte's intentional exposure of her breasts in a public place constituted willful and lewd exposure.
The court of appeals then turned to the issue of whether prosecuting Plancarte for publicly displaying her fully exposed breasts, while not prosecuting men for similar conduct, violated her constitutional right to equal protection under the law. The court concluded that women who expose their breasts in public are not similarly situated with men who expose their chests, and therefore, the statute did not violate the Equal Protection Clause.
Begrudging Judges
The court of appeals thus affirmed the district court's decision on both issues that each could have been grounds for dismissing the state’s case against Plancarte. Her conviction was allowed to stand, but it was far from a slam-dunk for the state. The three-judge bench, tiny as it was, had a lot of points of disagreement.
One judge wrote a concurring opinion because he didn’t think that the majority went far enough. He thought that there should be no “intent requirement in the statute at all, meaning that the prosecutor wouldn’t have to prove that Plancarte intended for her conduct to be “lewd.” He wrote that having such an intent requirement “would allow a person to avoid criminal consequences under the indecent exposure statute by saying they are simply enjoying the feeling of the fresh air as they walk around a public park with no pants and underwear.”
The third judge dissented altogether because he found the evidence insufficient, and because he was concerned about the equal protection implications of the statute.
Dissent Raises Many Questions
The dissenting judge pointed out that in order for the conviction to hold, the statute and precedent require the state to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Plancarte's conduct was “lewd.” But what does that even mean? The judge looked at previous Minnesota cases and concluded that the bar for “lewd” was high: the exposure had to be “obscene,” and Plancarte’s exposure did not rise to that level.
The dissent also took issue with the majority’s holding that a woman's “fully exposed breasts” are considered “private parts,” because, similarly, what does “fully exposed” mean? Does it require the nipple to be exposed? What if the nipple is partly visible through a sheer blouse? After all, this is just the sort of thing that happens on red carpets for the Oscars or Fashion Week in Manhattan. Why should it be different when it happens at a convenience store parking lot?
And how far does the descriptor “woman” go? Would the majority’s rule apply to a transgender woman, a transgender man, or a person whose breasts have, for any reason, been surgically altered? The dissent essentially pointed out that there are numerous questions that are too unclear for the majority’s holding to be applied fairly and evenly.
That judge also had Equal Protection concerns. He argued that the majority's interpretation introduces a gender classification not explicitly present in the statute. He criticized the majority’s reliance on existing case law due to changes in societal norms and the statutory exemption for breastfeeding.
The dissent also called for the Minnesota Legislature to re-examine the indecent exposure statute to address potential overreach and ensure it does not criminalize non-lewd conduct, especially in light of evolving societal standards and concerns about gender discrimination.
What to Expect
The fact that none of the judges could agree means it isn't surprising that the Minnesota Supreme Court took up the issue.
Plancarte's lawyer argued at oral argument that breasts are not genitals and cited other states' definitions and Minnesota's own sexual conduct laws to support this. The state attorney emphasized that intent and context determine indecency, suggesting even non-sexual body parts like elbows could be considered lewd in certain circumstances.
The court will also consider whether the law is applied equally to men and women, addressing potential constitutional issues of equal protection. We’ll have to wait to see how Minnesota's highest court rules. For now, though, women in Minnesota remain liable for breaking the law by going topless.
Related Resources:
- Gender Discrimination: Applicable Laws (FindLaw's Learn About the Law)
- What Do the Courts Consider in Indecent Exposure Cases? (FindLaw's Learn About the Law)
- Equal Protection Cases Based on Gender (FindLaw's U.S. Constitution Pages)
