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How Far Can a Library Enforce Peace and Quiet Before It Violates the First Amendment?

Vaidehi Mehta, Esq.

Article by: Vaidehi Mehta, Esq.

Attorney Writer

Reviewed by Joseph Fawbush, Esq. | Last updated on

A library isn’t the first place you’d expect a protest showdown. But when a Kansas public library tried to keep signs, protests, and “free speech activities” out of its reading rooms, a local activist sued, claiming his First Amendment rights were buried along with his posters. In a case called Spiehs v. Morgan, the Tenth Circuit has just weighed in on how far libraries can go to protect quiet study before they cross the line into unconstitutional speech control. 

Meet Justin Spiehs

Justin Spiehs is an activist in Lawrence, Kansas, known locally for frequent public‑comment appearances and protests about gender identity and local government.

In 2023, the Lawrence Public Library adopted a behavior policy banning conduct that disturbed others’ use, created an unsafe environment, impeded staff, or risked damage to property. In 2024, the board approved a Free Speech Activities Policy defining the library as “a limited public forum dedicated to the peaceful study and enjoyment of visitors free from disturbance” and barring “free speech activities” inside that would interfere with that purpose, including holding or carrying signs, protesting, distributing literature, and acting as a public speaker.

Spiehs began testing the new rules almost immediately. After the policy took effect, he stood inside holding a sign reading “Free speech died here, ask me how”; staff said it violated the indoor sign ban, he refused to comply, and police were called. He soon returned wearing a shirt with the same message and later unfolded another sign, again prompting staff to invoke the policy. On later visits, he carried a blank poster and a “Don’t tread on me” flag, which staff treated as covered by the sign and protest ban.

Those encounters led him to sue the library’s board and employees. In 2024, he filed a section 1983 action in federal district court against the Board of Directors of the Free Public Library of the City of Lawrence, its director Kathleen Morgan, and several staff members, alleging violations of free speech and equal protection, deprivation of procedural due process, and retaliation. He claimed the policies were unconstitutional on their face and as applied, used for viewpoint discrimination that chilled his speech, and that staff singled him out and suspended him without adequate process. The district court disagreed, granted summary judgment to the defendants, and found no constitutional injury — sending the case to the Tenth Circuit.

Procedural Ground: Standing, Waiver, Vagueness

On appeal, the first issue was standing. Spiehs sought declaratory and injunctive relief not only from the behavior and Free Speech Activities policies but also from exhibit, meeting‑room, and bulletin‑board rules that had never been enforced against him. The Tenth Circuit held he lacked standing to challenge those unapplied policies because he hadn’t shown any “continuing injury or an immediate threat of injury” or any chilling of his speech.

For the enforced policies, the court applied its chilled‑speech standard: standing requires both subjective and objective deterrence. In his brief, Spiehs said he “intends to return to the [l]ibrary communicating in the same manner described in these events,” which the judges took as evidence that his speech was not subjectively deterred. Without subjective chilling, he couldn’t obtain forward‑looking relief even as to rules that had been enforced.

His vagueness challenge was tied to that same request for declaratory and injunctive relief. Once the court found he lacked standing for prospective relief, it concluded it had no jurisdiction over vagueness.

Procedural rules also narrowed his other claims. His assertion that suspensions violated procedural due process was deemed waived because it was omitted from the final pretrial order. The December flag incident likewise could not support liability, both because it wasn’t preserved in the order and because, even if considered, it involved a held flag versus a worn flag — different conduct under the policy’s terms.

Substantive Ground: Forums, Content Neutrality, Tailoring

The remaining damages claims turned on forum doctrine. Relying on prior precedent, the court treated the Lawrence Public Library as a designated public forum for “receiving information and reading, writing or quiet contemplation.” In such a forum, the government may impose content‑neutral, narrowly tailored time, place, and manner limits that leave open other ways to speak.

Spiehs argued the Free Speech Activities Policy was content‑based because it banned “protesting” and similar expressive conduct, which he characterized as inherently negative speech. The court disagreed. On its face, “the library said nothing about the content of speech inside the library. To the contrary, the library banned all displays of signs regardless of what they said,” and listed protesting and other “free speech activities” without favoring any viewpoint. The panel relied on its own Verlo v. Martinez and Supreme Court cases upholding broad limits on protesting and demonstrating as content‑neutral when they apply to all speakers.

Because the policy doesn’t facially regulate content, the court examined its purpose. It emphasized that a public library’s core role is to protect patrons’ access to information “through reading, writing, and quiet contemplation,” describing it as “a place dedicated to quiet, to knowledge, and to beauty.” Viewed that way, the Free Speech Activities Policy was designed “to carry out this purpose by preserving and maintaining an atmosphere consistent with reading, receiving information, and study” rather than singling out particular topics or viewpoints. That made the policy content‑neutral in both text and justification.

For his as‑applied challenge, Spiehs highlighted three incidents: his “Free speech died here, ask me how” shirt and sign; a blank poster displayed alongside a companion’s critical sign; and the “Don’t tread on me” flag. In the first episode, staff ignored the shirt but intervened when he unfolded and held up the sign, which the court read as enforcement based on the conduct of holding a sign rather than the message. In the second, police responded to “protesters in the library,” and the court stressed that even a blank poster falls within a content‑neutral ban on all displayed signs. Across the preserved episodes, the panel concluded enforcement was “neutral as to content.”

On narrow tailoring, the court identified the city’s interest as preserving the library as a place “dedicated to quiet, to knowledge, and to beauty” and “the communication of ideas through quiet, contemplative activity.” It found the policies narrowly tailored because they targeted protesting and carrying signs inside, rather than banning all speech or expression. Rejecting Spiehs’s argument that only behavior that’s actually disruptive can be regulated, the judges noted that the library may adopt prophylactic rules to prevent likely distraction. They also stressed that the policies left “ample other channels of communication”: patrons could still read, wear expressive clothing, post to a community bulletin board, seek permission to display messages, reserve rooms where signs and speech are allowed, and protest right outside the building.

Equal Protection and Retaliation

Spiehs’s equal protection claim was a “class‑of‑one” theory that staff targeted him while treating companions more favorably. To succeed, he had to show he was intentionally treated differently from others “similarly situated in every material respect” without any rational basis. The court said video from the November 25 incident showed staff approaching only Spiehs because they saw him holding his “Free Speech Died Here Ask Me How” sign, while his companion hadn’t yet unfolded anything; as the staffer put it, “To my knowledge you don’t have a sign,” so the two weren’t similarly situated.

On retaliation, the court focused on whether Spiehs engaged in “constitutionally protected activity.” Having already upheld the library’s sign and protest restrictions as valid, content‑neutral time‑place‑manner rules, the panel held that his violations of those rules weren’t protected speech. Without protected activity, his retaliation claim failed before the judges reached injury or motive.

The Tenth Circuit closed by affirming summary judgment across the board. For libraries, the decision underscores that they can be treated as public forums centered on quiet, contemplative use and that content‑neutral limits on signs and protests inside are permissible when they protect that function and leave other avenues (expressive clothing, bulletin boards, meeting rooms, and outdoor protests) open.

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