President Donald Trump set a record during his second term by issuing 26 executive orders on his first day in office alone—more than any other U.S. president in history. Unsurprisingly, some of them were aimed at cracking down on immigration. What came as more of a surprise is that one of those orders aimed to abolish a principle that’s generally been supported by Democrats and Republicans alike: Birthright citizenship.
As a lot of people were surprised that birthright citizenship was even up for debate, there was a whole lot of litigation around it. The case made its way to the U.S. Supreme Court, which recently punted the question down the road on a technicality.
Let’s take a look at how we got there.
Trump Attempts to Redefine Citizenship
Executive Order 14160 aimed to trigger a seismic shift in American citizenship law—something Trump threatened to do in his first term. It sets out a new “policy of the United States” that fundamentally redefines who is entitled to citizenship at birth. It targets two very specific (and controversial) scenarios:
First, the Order says that if a child is born on U.S. soil, but their mother was in the country unlawfully at the time of birth, and their father was neither a U.S. citizen nor a lawful permanent resident, then that child is out of luck. No U.S. citizenship, no passport, no birthright. Under this new rule, the accident of a mother’s immigration status—and the father’s as well—becomes the key that locks the door to citizenship.
The second scenario may be even more surprising. The EO states that even if the mother was in the United States lawfully, but only on a temporary basis (think tourist, student, or any other short-term visa), her U.S.-born child is still denied citizenship if the father is not a citizen or green card holder. It doesn’t matter if the mother followed every rule, renewed her visa, or was here for a legitimate, legal reason. The mere fact that her presence was “temporary” is enough to disqualify her child from automatic citizenship, provided the father doesn’t have the right papers.
Apparently, it doesn’t matter that the Fourteenth Amendment has, for over a century, guaranteed citizenship to “all persons born or naturalized in the United States.”
The Order goes as far as stating that “the Fourteenth Amendment has never been interpreted to extend citizenship universally to everyone born within the United States. The Fourteenth Amendment has always excluded from birthright citizenship persons who were born in the United States but not ‘subject to the jurisdiction thereof.’”
Is this true? More on that later.
In both cases, the Order instructs federal agencies to stop issuing or accepting any documentation of citizenship for these children. That means no birth certificates marked “U.S. citizen,” no Social Security numbers, no passports. Nothing that would recognize them as Americans.
The message is clear: Your parents' circumstances, not the location of your birth, are now what count. And in a country that has long prided itself on jus soli (the idea that the soil you’re born on makes you American), this is nothing short of a revolution.
Nationwide Pushback
Unsurprisingly, a patchwork coalition of individuals (including pregnant women worried about their kids’ status), advocacy organizations, and state governments mobilized to challenge the Order in federal courts throughout the country.
In Maryland, Massachusetts, and Washington, judges pored over the Fourteenth Amendment and more than a century of precedent. Each district court found that the Executive Order was likely unconstitutional. They concluded that the plaintiffs (and anyone else in a similar situation) faced irreparable harm if the Order took effect.
The courts issued nationwide preliminary injunctions, which blocked the federal government from enforcing the Order against anyone in the United States, not just the named plaintiffs, until the litigation could play out.
Not thrilled with being told “no” on a national scale, the feds immediately appealed to the circuit courts of appeals. They argued that even if the Order was unconstitutional, the district courts had gone too far by blocking it for everyone, not just the people who sued.
But the courts of appeals weren’t swayed. They reviewed the district courts’ reasoning and, crucially, the scope of the injunctions. Each appellate court declined to narrow the injunctions, leaving the nationwide blocks in place.
Their rationale? The lower courts had carefully explained why anything less than a universal injunction would fail to provide “complete relief” to the plaintiffs, especially given the practical realities. For example, families moving across state lines and the administrative chaos that would ensue if the Order were only blocked for some people in some places.
SCOTUS Steps In (Sort Of)
The Trump administration was not about to prepare for the usual slow march of appeals and possible conflicting circuit decisions. With three nearly identical universal injunctions now standing in three different circuits, the president’s people, in return, filed three nearly identical emergency applications with the Supreme Court.
They asked the Supreme Court for partial stays to limit the injunctions so they only protected the actual plaintiffs. The Court consolidated the cases into one, Trump v. CASA, Inc.
Despite the high drama swirling around the case, the justices didn’t actually weigh in on whether Trump could end birthright citizenship as we know it.
Why not? Technically, no one asked them to — yet.
When the Trump admin filed for certiorari, they only asked a much narrower procedural question. Did the federal courts have the equitable authority to issue “universal” (or “nationwide”) injunctions?
In other words, the question was whether a single judge can block a federal policy for everyone, or only for the people who actually sued.
So, all the headline-grabbing constitutional questions about birthright citizenship, the Fourteenth Amendment, and the Nationality Act? Not the question before the Court. The only issue on the table was the scope of the remedy, not the substance of the right. SCOTUS's job (this time) was to grapple with the boundaries of judicial power itself. Just how far can a federal court go when it steps in to stop the executive branch?
Justice Barrett wrote the majority opinion, joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Thomas, Alito, Gorsuch, and Kavanaugh.
Both sides made policy arguments to bolster their stances on universal injunctions. The plaintiffs insisted that such sweeping relief is sometimes the only practical way to protect against unlawful government action. Meanwhile, the government warned that universal injunctions encourage forum shopping and chaos in federal law.
The majority, however, declared that policy considerations were beside the point. Instead, they anchored their decision solely in history.
History Lessons
The majority started with digging into the historical roots of the power to issue injunctions, going back to the Judiciary Act of 1789. That statute, which laid the foundation of the federal judiciary, gives federal courts jurisdiction over “all suits...in equity.”
But what does that actually mean? A series of cases has made it clear that this grant of authority isn’t a blank check.
Cases dating back to the 1800s (such as Boyle v. Zacharie & Turner and Payne v. Hook) established that federal courts must look to the traditional practice of equity in England, not to state law or modern innovations.
Federal courts are limited to the kinds of equitable remedies that were “traditionally accorded by courts of equity” at the time the country was founded. The courts can’t just invent new forms of relief. They're bound by the historical toolkit that English and early American chancellors had at their disposal.
But here’s the catch: universal injunctions simply didn’t exist in that historical toolkit. In both English and American courts, equity was all about resolving disputes between the parties before the court. The remedies were party-specific, tailored to the injuries and rights of the individuals who actually showed up to litigate. If you weren’t a party to the suit, you didn’t get the benefit of the court’s decree.
This wasn’t just a quirk of legal tradition. It was a foundational principle, reflected in early cases like Scott v. Donald. There, even when plaintiffs challenged the constitutionality of a law, the Court limited relief to the named parties — no more, no less.
It wasn’t until the 20th century that federal courts started experimenting with universal injunctions. And even then, such remedies were rare and controversial. For most of American history, the idea that a single district judge could issue an order binding the whole country was unthinkable.
No Shortcuts
The plaintiffs tried to justify universal injunctions by drawing an analogy to “bills of peace.” Bills of peace allowed courts to resolve disputes for groups without joining every member to the lawsuit. They allowed a small group to litigate on behalf of everyone similarly situated, and the resulting decree would bind the whole group.
But the majority was unconvinced. Unlike universal injunctions, bills of peace did not provide relief to all possible nonparties. Thus, the Court found that the analogy fell flat: universal injunctions are not rooted in this equitable tradition and bypass essential protections. Bills of peace were not the ancestor of universal injunctions, but of class action lawsuits — which have specific procedural safeguards set out in Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
The majority said that if the plaintiffs want relief that extends beyond the named parties, they need to do it the old-fashioned way. By certifying a class action under Rule 23.
The majority determined that universal injunctions are essentially a “shortcut” that lets courts sidestep the procedural protections of class actions, such as providing notice, the right to opt out, and adequate representation.
But universal injunctions are not a substitute for going through the class action process, the Court held. If you want to stop the enforcement of a federal policy for everyone who might be affected, you need to certify a class and meet the requirements of Rule 23.
Otherwise, relief is limited to the actual plaintiffs in the case.
‘Complete Relief’ vs. ‘Universal Relief’
The plaintiffs contended that universal injunctions were necessary to provide “complete relief.” They argued that anything less would leave them exposed to ongoing harm. The Supreme Court, however, drew a sharp line between “complete relief” and “universal relief." Only the former, the Court held, is permitted under traditional equitable principles.
“Complete relief” refers to the court’s power to fully resolve the harm suffered by the actual parties in a lawsuit. This is often referred to as "making the plaintiffs whole." For example, if a pregnant plaintiff sues to block an executive order that would deny her child citizenship, “complete relief” means ensuring her child is recognized as a citizen.
The upshot? “Complete relief” is party-specific. It’s about tailoring the remedy to the people before the court, not issuing a sweeping fix for everyone who might be affected. The majority emphasized that while an injunction might incidentally benefit nonparties, the legal protection only extends to the actual plaintiffs.
Recognizing the complexity of the states’ claims, the Court remanded for lower courts to decide whether a more tailored injunction could still fully redress the state plaintiffs’ injuries.
Big Questions Left Unanswered
Ultimately, the conservative majority held that universal injunctions likely exceed the equitable authority granted by Congress. The Court concluded that a partial stay is appropriate. The plaintiffs remain protected, but the injunctions are narrowed.
Liberal Justices Sotomayor, Kagan, and Jackson dissented. They argued that the majority’s decision guts the judiciary’s power to check unlawful executive action and leaves constitutional rights unprotected for anyone not named in a lawsuit.
Justice Jackson wrote a separate dissent, doubling down on the existential threat to the rule of law posed by the Court’s refusal to allow universal injunctions and warning that the decision creates a dangerous “zone of lawlessness” for the executive branch.
The government’s applications for partial stays were granted, but only insofar as the injunctions extend beyond what is necessary to provide complete relief to each plaintiff. The case now returns to the lower courts to tailor the injunctions accordingly.
Remember, SCOTUS said nothing about the merits of birthright citizenship. They didn’t opine on whether the Order is constitutional, whether it’s a good idea, or whether it squares with more than a century of precedent. All of that is still up in the air, and these questions probably will come back to the Court. But they’ll have to go through the cumbersome process of appeals first. Until then, Trump’s order will still be effective for anyone who wasn’t part of one of the lawsuits.
Related Resources:
- Florida Seeks a Stay From SCOTUS in Legal Battle Over Immigration Enforcement Law (FindLaw's Federal Courts)
- First Circuit Denies Stay on Trump’s Birthright Citizenship Order (FindLaw's Federal Courts)
- It's Not Over Yet: Here's What to Know About Litigation Surrounding the Birthright Citizenship Executive Order. (FindLaw's Courtside)
